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ABSTRACT 
Committees operating with simple majority rule procedures 
and with closed rule procedures are studied. A new method (the 
duplicate method) was used to induce preferences. The results of 
the control experiments compare favorably to those for which 
monetary incentives have been used. In all cases the core is a 
relatively accurate model of committee choices. 
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The experiments and methods reported below are part of a 
broader attempt to ascertain the influence of decision-making 
procedures on the choices made by committees. Recent experimental 
research addressing the question of decision rule influences have 
relied upon substantial financial incentives as a means of controlling 
critical parameters within committee processes. In this paper we 
introduce a new method of inducing preferences (called the "duplicate 
method") that seems to produce a level of control similar to that 
achieved through financial incentives, but that is relatively less 
expensive and, hence, may make this type of experimental research 
more accessible. w·e use this new method to study the substantive 
question of the effects and implications of the "closed rule" on 
committee processes. 
The "closed rule" procedures under examination are a set 
of rules governing the terms under which motions on the floor can be 
amended by a deliberative body. In the procedures studied below 
both amendments and motions require a majority to pass. Under the 
control procedures no individual has any special power beyond those 
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powers implicit in majority rule and ordinary rules of order, Under 
the closed rule procedure, however, a single individual has the power 
to prohibit amendments to motions. The power of an individual or 
group to block amendments is not uncommon. Sometimes committees in 
the United States House of Representatives are granted such powers 
by the Rules Committee. The process is also analogous to one in 
which there exists an individual whose decisions are implemented 
only after they are ratified by the majority of a committee of which 
he/she is a voting member. 
This particular version of the closed rule procedure was 
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first studied by Isaac and Plott (1978) , The principal conclusion 
of that study was that the core of a rather naturally defined 
cooperative game was substantially more accurate in predicting outcomes 
than were any of the competing models (bargaining sets, von Neumann-
Morgenstern solutions) .  Unfortunately the core in the Isaac and Plott 
experiments seemed "fair" to some individuals so the reliability of 
the core alone as a predictive model in the absence of any "fairness" 
properties could not be clearly determined. In addition, the comparisons 
with other committee experimental work (e.g., Fiorina and Plott, 1978) 
is somewhat clouded since the Isaac/Plott committees only had three 
members (as opposed to five) and the committees had only ten alternatives 
to consider (as opposed to an infinite number) . 
The procedures studied in this paper are the same institutions 
that were explored by Isaac/Plott but the parameter configurations are 
comparable to those implemented by Berl et al. (1976) and Florina· and 
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Plott (1978), The space of alternatives is euclidean two-space, and 
indifference curves are circles arranged such that the majority-rule 
core/equilibrium exists. Committees have five members. Thus, the 
experiments reported here form a logical link between previous studies. 
The natural conjecture is that the core which seems to have been a 
good model of committee choices for the (three-person, ten-alternative) 
closed rule experiments and which has been generally a good model 
for the (five-person, infinite-alternatives) simple majority-rule 
committees will continue to be accurate when the rules governing 
committee decision processes are changed, 
In previous experiments the payoff medium was dollars. No 
money at all was used in the experiments reported here. Instead the 
payoff was in points toward a course grade where the points were 
determined by the duplicate method in which a competition pitted 
"similarly situated" individuals (not on the same committee) against 
each other (in duplicate bridge fashion). In view of substantial 
results indicating that the payoff medium is important in committee 
research (Fiorina and Plott. 1978) checks (controls) were built into 
the research design to ensure that the preference parameters were 
properly induced, Since this type of payoff medium can potentially 
reduce research costs and remove suspicions which some researchers 
have about the sole use of monetarily induced preferences, it is an 
important aspect of our study, 
The study is organized as follows. The first section is 
devoted to the payoff methodology and parameters. The theory and 
theoretical conjectures are introduced in the second section, 
Following that the experimental procedures are explained, A discussion 
of results and conclusions are in the fourth section, The basic 
results are that the method of inducing preferences seems to have 
worked for us and the core model was a reasonable predictor of the 
outcomes. 
I, INDUCED PREFERENCES 
A. The Reward Medium and the Duplicate Method 
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The theory of induced preference and its role in experimental 
work has been discussed extensively elsewhere (Smith 1976, Plott 1979) . 
i The basic idea is to provide each individual, i, a reward medium, v , 
the magnitude of which depends upon some known (to i) functional 
relationship, fi, to the decisions, x, made by the group. Thus if X 
is the set of all possible decisions, vi= fi(x), x £ X induces a 
preference relation 
(1) i j i xR x' <> f (x) 2_ f (x'). 
The key assumptions are that vi is valued by i and that the 
i 
elements of X hold no value for i other than as determined through f (x). 
When vi is a sizable monetary reward, there are no side payments, and 
the magnitude of vj is unknown to i, these conditions are more or less 
satisfied and define the conditions under which previous research 
has been conducted. 
In the experiments below, the reward medium was points toward 
a final course grade (as well as a possible appeal to individuals' 
capacity to enjoy competition). The problem with using such rewards 
which the duplicate method seems to overcome is the possibility of zero-
sum conflicts which stem from course competition or from the competitive 
attitude itself. Ordinarily if one does well in a competition for 
grades or in a test of skills, the others involved in the same 
competition must necessarily do poorly, For example, in group 
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decision making one wants to avoid the situation in which individual 
i can do well only by taking actions which make others in the group 
do poorly, because then the individualistic structure of the reward 
medium as implied by (1) is lost. A competitive reward structure can 
thus easily induce group decision situations in which there are no 
"gains from exchange"--only conflict. 
The duplicate method was implemented as follows. A large 
class of students was divided into several groups of five students 
each. Each group was called a committee and was given an index k. 
The individual members of each committee were indexed from one to 
five. Thus, each individual subject was indexed (jk) where k was 
the committee of which the individual was a member and j was the 
name (associated with particular preference parameters) the individual 
had within that committee 
If Xk was the set of alternatives for committee k, then 
pjk = pjk(x) , x E Xk, was the "game point" reward to individual j on 
that committee. Given that there were K committees, the reward 
medium, the points toward a final course grade as opposed to the game 
points, were of the form Rjk = fj(pjl,pJ2, ... , pj
k, ... ,pJK) . That is, 
the points toward a final course grade received by an individual were 
determined by the number of game points (s) he received in comparison 
with the game points received by those individuals on other committees 
who occupied the same position (had the same preference parameter) . 
The crucial element of this reward structure is that the game points 
ik received by members of the same committee (i. e., p , i -f j) had no 
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effect at all on RJk, Thus, as long as final course grades are 
positively valued and afJ/apjk > O, the level surfaces of pjk(x) become 
k indifference curves for j on X • 
Without the notation and in somewhat more detail the key 
function fj(pJ1, • . •  ,pJK) was determined as follows. Points awarded 
to students towards their grades were determined by their ordinal 
rankings relative to other "similarly situated" students, i.e. , those 
with the same member number in other committees with the same 
experimental instructions. Students in the top 20 percent were given 
two points towards their final grade, students in the second 20 pe�cent 
were given one point. No points were given to students in the lower 
60 percent. These point awards were in addition to a total of one 
hundred class points available on the exams, 
The impact of the points on the students' grade was 
determined as follows. Specific numerical cutoffs for A's, B's, C's, 
D's and F's, were determined on the basis of the distribution of exam 
points alone, and an initial grade was assigned independent of performance 
on the experiment. The points on the experiment could then only improve 
a student's grade over his initial grade by raising him above the various 
determined cutoffs. Thus only students within one or two points of the 
cutoff could be affected. 
In order to assess the expected value of the point awards the 
students were given the following information. In prior courses given 
by the instructor it was determined that approximately 10 percent of 
the students were within two points and 5 percent within one point of 
the cutoffs. 1�us with approximately a 10 percent probability, being 
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in the top 20 percent of experimental performance would raise a student's 
letter grade; and with approximately 5 percent probability, being in the 
second 20 percent would raise a student's letter grade. 
In addition to the point awards students were asked to take 
the experiment seriously and were told that their performance would be 
compared on an informal basis to the performance of students in past 
and future experiments. Thus in addition to the grades the students 
were involved in a competition with some sort of absolute standard 
established by others who had been similarly involved. To the extent 
that one can speak of a desire to compete, this desire was channeled 
into an attempt to maximize one's own points without regard to the 
points received by others on the same committee. 
Thus, the basic idea of the duplicate method of preference 
inducement is reminiscent of duplicate bridge whereby the competition 
is against "similarly situated" individuals. Competition with "similarly 
situated" individuals is certainly zero sum. But since similarly 
situated individuals are not in the same committee, the reward structures 
within the committee need not exhibit the zero-sum character. 
B. The Preference Parameters 
The basic problem for each committee was to pick a single 
( k - 2) point in euclidean two-space i.e., X = E . The preference parameters 
are graphed on Figure 1. Individuals are indexed as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
The point with the individual index is that person's most preferred 
point in the space (euclidean two-space) of alternatives. (The method 
of inducing these preferences was outlined above.) That is, the most 
preferred points of individuals 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are (30, 52), (39, 68), 
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(62, 109) , (165, 32) , and (25, 72) , respectively. All indifference curves 
are circular; a representative indifference curve is drawn in the figure 
for each individual. The actual functions expressed in points given as 
a function of the final group choice are as follows. 
1 p (x,y) 
2 
P (x,y) 
3 p (x,y) 
4 p (x,y) 
5 
p (x,y) 
6,000,000 - 30,000[(x - 30) 2 + (y - 52) 2)112 
1,000,000 - 5,000[(x - 39) 2 + (y - 68) 2)112 
15,000 - 82 [(x - 62) 2 + (y - 109) 2)112 
500,000 - 2,200[(x - 165) 2 + (y - 32) 2)1/2
10,000 - 52[(x - 25) 2 + (y - 72) 2]
1/2 
A comparison of the functions suggests that the units were 
considerably different. Each individual knew that the "value" of the 
points was based upon a comparison of the points received by "similarly 
situated" people. Because the identities of the other similarly 
situated people were not revealed, because there was no chance for 
organized comparison across groups, and because the units were substantially 
different, we suspected that problems of "side payments" were minimal. 
Thus, if the individuals cared about points toward a grade, or if they 
cared about how they did in comparison to "similar" individuals (the 
utility of competing) , then the indifference curves are as presupposed 
by the parameter values applied in the model. 
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II, THEORY AND DESIGN 
Three different treatments were used, The first was simple 
majority rule, Committees operating under this rule are referenced 
as MR committees. The second was closed rule and the powers under 
the closed rule were given to the individual in position 3 on Figure 1. 
These committees are called CR3 committees. The third also operated 
under the closed rule but the powers were given to the individual 
in position 4 on Figure 1. These committees are referenced as CR4 
cornrnittees, 
The eimple majority rule procedures were those studied by 
Fiorina and Plott (1978), The process begins with an initial motion 
on the floor (200,150), This motion on the floor is then open for 
amendments which have to be passed by a majority to be effective. The 
process of amendment continues until a majority decides to stop 
discussion and vote on the amended motion. The final motion passed by 
a majority is the committee choice, Should the committee fail to adopt 
a final motion, the status quo (-200,-200) was automatically adopted. 
2 Since the procedures were essentially the same as Fiorina/Plott, one 
would expect the outcome to be similar if the preferences were success-
fully controlled by the method of preference inducement outlined in 
Section I. Thus, the simple majority rule committees served as controls 
on our experimentai procedures. 
If the rule is simple majority rule with an unrestricted 
amendment procedure and, if the preferences are as shown on Figure 1, 
then the core of the appropriate cooperative game model is point A, 
the point of maximum for individual 2. If people vote their preferences 
alone, no other point can achieve a majority vote over this point in a 
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binary contest. This model has been an accurate predictor of committee 
choices for this particular pattern of preferences and a variety of 
others. This generates the first conjecture. 
Conjecture 1: MR Committees Will Choose Point .A 
The closed rule process is similar to simple majority rule 
except for one major exception. One individual is designated as a 
"convener" who has the exclusive right to propose amendments to any 
motion, Motions are still subject to full discussion and majority 
rule, but formal motions to implement any alternative other than the 
status quo can be submitted by the convener alone. Furthermore, 
the procedures are such that the convener can make no "mistakes" 
by submitting motions (s) he would regret later (formal submissions 
are made as part of the final vote) , Thus, the convener can "block" 
any motion, x, other than the status quo by simply refusing to endorse 
an amendment to any motion on the floor which would make x become the 
motion on the floor, A motion cannot be adopted unless the convener 
agrees that it can be considered, so a refusal to grant permission 
constitutes a block, 
If the rules are changed from majority rule to the closed 
rule, then the core will generally change. If individual 3 is made 
the convener, any majority which finally votes in a motion other than 
the status quo must have individual 3 as a member. Then the core 
becomes the dotted line segment, AB, which connects the points of 
maximum of individuals 2 and 3 as shown in Figure 1. Intuitively, 
this can be seen as follows. Choose two alternatives on the dotted 
line. Call them x and y and let x be the closest to the maximum 
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for individual 3. Since individual 3 prefers x to y, y does not 
dominate x. Since a majority prefers y to x, x does not dominate y. 
Therefore, points on the line are mutually undominated. A similar 
argument can be applied to show that points on the dotted line 
segment are undominated in general, and that any point off the 
segment is dominated by some point on the segment. Therefore, the 
dotted line segment is the core--the set of undominated options. 
This leads to the second conjecture. 
Conjecture 2: CR3 Committees Will Choose Points on AB 
If individual 4 is made the convener, the core is still 
different. In this case it is the dotted line segment, AC, connecting 
the point A to the maximum for individual 4. This leads to the third 
conjecture. 
Conjecture 3: CR4 Committees Will Choose Points on the Segment AC 
III. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
A. Design 
Subjects were students in two economics classes in the 
MBA program at the University of Chicago.
3 
The first class of eighty 
students was divided into sixteen committees of five persons each. 
One committee was discarded because only four people met. Thus, in 
Class I there were fifteen committees studied. The second class of 
thirty students was divided into six committees of five persons each. 
Thus we have twenty-one decisions to report. 
The assignment of subjects to experimental conditions was 
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as follows. In Class I, six of the fifteen committees were assigned 
to the MR condition (simple majority rule) , five had individual 3 as 
a convener (the CR3 condition) and four committees had individual 4 
as a convener (the CR4 condition) . The simple majority committees 
served as controls for comparison with the result of other experiments. 
4 In Class II two of the six committees were assigned to the MR condition 
while for the remaining four committees individual 4 was the convener 
(the CR4 condition) . Again the simple majority rule committees are 
viewed as a control group that are designed to detect influences of 
differences in experimental procedures on subject pools between Class I, 
Class II, and other studies of committee decisions. 
B. Instructions and Control 
Both the instructions and the circumstances of the committee 
meetings differed substantially from those of previous committee 
experiments. During all previous committee decisions the experimenter 
was present to make sure amendments were clearly stated, discussion 
was allowed, votes were properly counted, and no side payments occurred, 
By contrast some of the committees reported on here set their own 
meeting time and all met without the benefit of monitoring by the 
experimenter, 
Instructions (see Appendix) were read by the experimenter 
during class time. The figure in the instructions was on the 
blackboard and the points in the instructions were illustrated 
while the instructions were read. A few parenthetical remarks were 
made clarifying the instructions in response to questions. In 
addition subjects were urged to do as wel l as they could. 
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Subjects in Class � were allowed to take the instructions 
home and were required to draw the level surfaces of their payoff 
function on a grid to be used during their meeting. Each committee 
arranged its own meeting time, By contrast the committees in 
Class II met during class time. The level surfaces of preferences, 
etc. were drawn on a grid and given to them during class. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The first question we address is whether our new method 
of inducing individual preferences is successful compared to the 
financial incentive used previously. To answer this we can compare 
the results of our MR control group experiments with those of Florina 
and Plott, in which the same preference parameters and procedures 
were used, 
The data for all experiments are shown in Table l; the data 
for the MR experiments are shown in Figure 2. As a measure of success 
we use the mean deviations from the predicted outcome of point A. In 
our experiments the mean deviation was 2.2 units; in the Florina/Plott 
experiments the mean deviation was 4. 8 units when a "high" financial 
incentive was utilized and over 20 units when a "low" payoff was 
utilized. Thus, relative to the core model of group choice, our 
method seems to have motivated performance at least as well as significant 
financial incentives did. 
The second set of questions addresses the substantive issues 
concerning committee decision processes. We have seen that in our 
control group, MR experiments, the core seems to predict actual outcomes 
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TABLE 1 
Individuals 
Voting 
in Favor 
2, 3, S
2, 3, 4 
1, 2, S  
1, 2, S 
1, 2, 4, 5 
1, 2, 4 
1, 2, S 
1, 3, 4 
1, 2, 4 
1, 2, 3, 4, S 
1, 2, 3  
1, 2, 4 
2, 3, 4 
1, 2, 4
1, 2, 4, S 
3, 4 , 5
1, 2, 5
1, 2, 3
2, 3, 5 
? 
Outcome 
40, 70 
45, 60 
39, 68 
40, 67 
39, 68 
40, 70* 
39, 65* 
40, 67 
8S, 65 
63, 60 
39, 68 
120, S2 
82, 60 
104, 60 
90, 60 
90, 50 
4S, 70 
3S, 63 
SS, 7S 
40, 80 
44, 72 
Deviation 
from 
Core 
2. 4 
5. 6 
0 
1. 4 
0 
2. 4 
3. 0 
2. 2 
9. 0 
1. 5 
0 
7. 0 
4.0 
10. 0 
6. 0 
3. 0 
S. l 
4. 0 
5. 6 
11. 2 
s.o 
2.S 
S. 7 
*
Transformed from actual parameters (see footnote 2) . 
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of the experiments at least as well as it did in earlier studies. 
We now wish to see whether changing the rules under which committees 
operate to reach their decisions affects significantly the outcome 
of the decision and whether the core predicts well the actual outcomes. 
The predictions of the game theoretic approach were developed in 
Conjectures 1, 2, and 3. 
The data for each of the two types of closed rule experiments 
are graphed in Figures 3 and 4, the data being taken from Table 1. 
As can be seen from the figures, the outcomes generally cluster near 
the core of each. When the convener was individual 3, the results 
seem a little disbursed (Figure 3) but appear to have a reasonable 
orientation relative to the core. The data for the CR4 committees 
is more striking in the sense that they are distributed near the CR4 
core. 
In order to make the conjectures under consideration 
operational, we undertook a series of statistical comparisons of 
the data across the three experiments. These comparisons are 
summarized in the following statistical hypotheses tests which 
utilize the data in Table 1. 
Hl: The data from the C4 experiments are drawn from the same 
distribution around the MR core as the data from the MR 
experiments. 
Result: An F-test was constructed using the sum-of-squared deviations 
from the MR core (i.e., point A in Figure 1) of both the C4 
and the MR data, The ratio of these sums-of-squares, reflecting 
degrees of freedom adjustments, was over 350, while 
F.05(8,7) 
= 3.7. Thus, Hl is easily rejected at the .05 
confidence level. 
H2: The data from the C3 experiments are drawn from the same 
distribution around the MR core as the data from the MR 
experiments. 
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Result: A similar F-test as for Hl was constructed. The (adjusted) 
ratio of sums-of-squares was over 15, while F.05(5,7) 
= 4.0. 
Thus, H2 is easily rejected at the .05 confidence level. 
H3: The data from the C4 experiment are drawn from the same 
distribution around the C3 core as the data from the C3 
experiments. 
Result: A similar F-test as for Hl was constructed using minimum 
distance to the C3 core (line A,B in Figure 1) as the 
H4: 
measure of deviation. The (adjusted) ratio of sums-of-squares 
was over 110, while F.05(8,5) 
= 4.8. Thus, H3 is easily 
rejected at the ,05 confidence level. 
The data from the MR experiments are drawn from the same
distribution along the C4 core as the data from the C4 
experiments. 
Result: Since the MR core is a subset of the C4 core, and since the 
standard deviation of the data from the MR experiments is
smaller than for the C4 experiments, the F-test is not 
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powerful enough to reject the hypothesis that the MR data 
is drawn from the same distribution around the C4 core as 
the C4 data is. However, the nonparametric Mann Whitney 
U-test for equality of medians is capable of testing whether 
the distributions along the C4 core, i.e., at the point along 
the C4 core of minimum distance, are drawn from the same 
distribution. The U-value for the data is 3, while the 
critical u.OS(S, 8) = 7. Thus, H4 is rejected at the .OS 
confidence level. 
HS: The data from the MR experiments are drawn from the same 
distribution along the C3 core as the data from the C4 
experiments. 
Result: A similar U-test as for H4 was constructed. The U-value 
for the data is 4, while the critical u.OS(S, 7) = S. Thus, 
HS is rejected at the .OS confidence level. 
H6: The data from the C3 experiments are drawn from the same 
distribution along the C4 core as the data from the C4 
experiments. 
Result: A similar U-test as for H4 and HS was constructed. The 
U-value for the data is S, while the critical u.OS(7, 8)
Thus, H6 is rejected at the .OS confidence level. 
13. 
The t�HtS of the operational hypotheses 1 through 6 all 
support Conjectures 1, 2, and 3. The results can be summarized as 
saying that changes in the rules under which committee decisions are 
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made induce outcomes that are well predicted by the core of the 
appropriate game. One would like in addition to devise a way to 
indicate how well the data from the C3 and C4 experiments conform to 
the predicted outcomes of Conjectures 2 and 3, respectively, in some 
absolute (as opposed to a comparative) manner. In moving towards 
this we ran two regressions, one on the C3 data and one on the C4 data. 
The purpose was simply to determine the "best" linear fit of the data 
and the corresponding standard errors of their estimates. In both 
cases the data were transformed Bo that a line with both the slope and 
intercept coeffecients equal to zero corresponded to the relevant core. 
In both cases, the estimated intercepts and slopes were 
insignificantly different from zero at the .OS confidence level. 
However, this would not be a very powerful result if the standard errors 
were very large and the estimated line very "far" from the core. In 
Figures S and 6, we present the estimated regression line and the 
one standard error band along with the relevant core. The C4 
experiments generate "better" results in the sense of smaller standard 
errors, but in both cases, the theoretical core lies well within the 
one standard error core of the regression estimates. 
Before concluding, a few more observations are of interest. 
We have no satisfactory hypothesis which might serve as an explanation 
as to why the C3 data deviate the most from the core predictions. We 
did notice that the largest outlier (3S, 63) was voted in by a coalition 
which did not include the convener. This leads us to suspect that 
either there was some confusion in this committee about the convener's 
powers or this convener chose to relinquish the powers! 
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FIGURE 6 Core Regression and one Standard Error for CR4 Committees 
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The data across a1ll experiments have one pattern which is 
not the same as that generated by another experiment. Whereas the 
outcomes in Hoffman and Plott (1980) were Pareto optimal relative 
to the set of people who voted in the final motion, this is not true 
in these data. Finally, we can detect no differences in the results 
generated by Class I or Class II groups. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The idea that group choices are systematically influenced 
by procedures receives substantial support in this study. The pattern 
of committee decisions changes systematically as the decision process 
is changed from simple majority rule to the closed rule and as the 
authority granted by the closed rule is changed. Not only do 
institutions systematically influence group choice, the influence 
observed to date conforms closely to that predicted by the core of 
a cooperative game model without side payments. In this respect our 
experiments provide a set of independent data to be added to those 
of Isaac and Plott (1978) which support the hypothesis that the core 
is in general the appropriate model for committee decision making 
under the closed rule. 
The nonmonetary medium reward employed in this study appears 
to have successfully induced preferences and definitely promises to 
open up experimental methods and research to many more potential 
researchers. We cannot conjecture at this point as to the relative 
importance of the potential grade versus the "natural competitiveness" 
in motivating performance. The position scoring (or duplicate scoring) 
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method, however, did seem to translate successfully what was basically 
a zero sum conflict from an individual committee point of view into a 
nonzero sum conflict. Naturally the control experiments are critical 
for any such interpretation. For others who do not otherwise have 
access to the necessary financial support, we recommend the substantial 
use of controls to tie the results back to studies in which money was 
used. 
The introduction of a new reward medium adds one additional 
dimension of interest to the results. Researchers have worried about 
the possible existence of special effects due to the use of money. 
The payoff gradients, the absolute magnitudes of money involved, and 
even the use of money may engender behavior which is unique to the 
laboratory. These experiments tend to reduce the importance of this 
line of inquiry since monetary rewards were not involved at all but 
the pattern of results relative to the models involved is virtually 
identical to those in which money was used. 
APPENDIX 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The instructions for the MR committees are those used 
by Fiorina and Plott (1978) and are reproduced there. The only 
changes involved the removal of references to money. 
Instructions for CR3 and CR4 committees were the same 
as those for MR committees except for page 3. They were the
same for each other except for the blank on page 3 which indicated 
the conveners. 
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Check List 
Committee Number 
Individual Number 
Read Instructions 
Prepare individual payoff chart 
Take test 
Attend meeting 
Maintain individual record of meeting 
Compute individual payoff 
Enter payoff into committee choice record held 
by individual 
Return � materials 
28 
29 
INSTRUCTIONS CR4-l 
General. You are about to participate in a connnittee process experiment 
in which one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen by majority 
rule. The purpose of the experiment is to gain insight into certain 
features of complex political processes. The instructions are simple. 
If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a 
considerable improvement in your grade. 
Instructions to Connnittee Members. The alternatives are represented by 
points on the blackboard. The committee will adopt as the connnittee 
decision one and only one point. Your compensation depends on the 
particular point chosen by the committee (see attached payoff chart) , 
For example, suppose your payoff chart is that given in Figure 1 and 
that the committee's final choice of alternatives is the point (x,y) 
(170,50) . Your compensation in this event would be 7,000. If the policy 
of the connnittee is (140,125) your compensation would be computed as 
follows: 
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CR4-2 
The point (140,125) is halfway between the curve marked 
7,000 and the curve marked 8,000. So, your compensation is halfway 
between 7,000 and 8,000, i.e., 7,500. If the policy is one-quarter 
of the distance between two curves, then your payoff is determined 
by the same proportion (i.e., at (75,50) which is one-quarter of the 
way between 8,000 and 9,000, you get 8,250) . 
The compensation charts may differ among individuals. 
This means that the patterns of preferences differ and the payoff 
amounts are not comparable, The point which would result in the 
highest payoff to you may not result in the highest payoff to someone 
else. You should decide what decision you want the connnittee to make 
and do whatever you wish within the confines of the rules to get 
things to go your way. The experimenters, however, are not primarily 
concerned with whether or how you participate so long as you stay 
within the confines of the rules, [Under no circumstances may you 
mention anything quantitative about your compensation. You are free, 
if you wish, to indicate which ones you like best, etc., but you 
cannot mention anything about the actual credit amounts. Under no 
circumstances may you mention anything about activities which 
might involve you and other connnittee members after the experiment, 
i.e., no deals involving side payments afterward or no physical threats.] 
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CR4-3 
Parliamentary Rules, The following parliamentary procedures must 
be followed. Individual number of the committee has been 
designated as a convener, The option chosen by the committee will 
be the one proposed by the convener and ratified by a majority of 
the committee (three or more people) . Any failure of the committee 
to act will automatically result in a committee choice of option 
(-200, -200) . 
The convener may propose any option he/she wants or 
he/she can refuse to propose any option if he/she so desires. 
Proposals or amendments to proposals must be stated formally and 
clearly by the convener. Any proposal by the convener automatically 
cancels any previous, unratified proposals. 
A proposal is ratified if it is approved by a simple 
majority, That is, a proposal becomes ratified if it is formally 
proposed by the convener and if the number of votes in favor of 
the proposal is greater than the number which oppose the proposal. 
A proposal once ratified is final and all participants will receive 
points accordingly. A proposal which is not ratified and is then 
canceled by another proposal may be proposed again and again. 
Are there any questions? 
We would like you to answer the questions on the attached 
page. These should help you understand the instructions. 
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MR-3 
Parliamentary Rules. The process begins with an existing motion (200,150) 
on the floor, You are free to propose amendments to this motion, Suppose, 
for example, (170,50) is the motion on the floor and you want the group to 
consider the point (140,125) , Simply raise your hand and when you are 
recognized by the chair, say "I move to amend the motion to (140,125) ." 
The group will then proceed to vote on the amendment. If the amendment 
passes by a majority vote, the point (140,125) is the new motion on the 
floor and is subject, itself, to amendments. If the amendment fails, the 
motion (170,50) remains on the floor and is subject to further amendment. 
Thus, amendments simply change the motion on the floor. You may pass as 
many amendments as you wish. 
At any time during the consideration of an amendment or the 
motion on the floor a motion to end debate is in order, If there are no 
objections, an immediate vote will take place, If there are objections, 
the motion to end debate will itself be put to a majority vote. If the 
motion to end debate fails, the amendment process continues, If it passes, 
a vote on the amendment or motion will take place, 
To sum up, the existing motion on the floor is (200,150) , You 
are free to amend this motion as you wish. The meeting will not end until 
a majority consents to end debate and accept some motion. Your compensation 
will be determined by the motion on the floor finally adopted by the 
majority. However, should the committee fail to reach an agreement, the 
committee choice will be designated as the point (-200,-200) . 
Are there any questions? 
We would like you to answer the questions on the attached page. 
These should help you understand the instructions. 
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CR4-4 
TEST 
1. At -------- I would receive the most possible credit. The 
number of credit points I would receive is --------� 
2. At -------- I would receive the least possible credit points. 
The number I would receive is 
-------------
3. Suppose (200, 150) is the motion on the floor and an amendment to 
move to point (199, 149) passes (fails) , then the new motion on the
floor is --------- . __
__
___
_ 
)? 
4. Suppose an amendment to move to (100,100) passes and no further 
amendments pass. If the motion on the floor is then adopted by a 
majority, my payment in point credits is------------
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Payoff Sheet CR4-5 
Committee Number 
Individual Number 2 
Type 2 points 1,000,000 - 5000 [(x - 39)2 + {y - 68)2)1/2
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CR4-6 
Time beginning -----­
Time end 
Motion on 
Floor Amendment 
Voting in 
Favor 
Motion on 
Floor Amendment 
Voting in 
Favor 
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CR4-7 
Tjrne for Decision 
Committee Number 
Committee Choice 
Name Points 
Person 1 ------------ Type 1 point
s 
Person 2 ------------- Type 2
 points 
Person 3 e 
3 points 
Person 4 -------------
Type 4 points 
Person 5 -------------
Type 5 points 
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FOOTNOTES 
* The financial support of the National Science Foundation and the 
Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1. In a different theoretical context it has also been studied by 
Brown (1975) . 
2. The status quo differs. It was (200, 150) in the Fiorina and 
Plott experiments. Under simple majority rule the outcome should 
be independent of the status quo as well as the initial motion on
the floor.
3. Kormendi was the professor. 
4. The control committees in Class II operated under a 180 degree 
translation in the space with no other changes in the pj(x,y) 
functions. The status quo, however, did not undergo the same 
translation. The results of these experiments, other experimental 
results, and the theory itself suggest that this should make no 
difference under simple majority rule. The actual parameters 
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and outcomes are reported below. The outcomes are entered in 
Table 1 and the figures, after a retranslation of indices. 
Individual Class I Class II 
1 (30, 52) (160, 68) 
2 (39, 68) (151, 52) 
3 (62, 109) (128, 11) 
4 (165, 32) (25, 80) 
5 (25, 72) (165, 48) 
Committee Outcome Re translation 
MR 6 (150, 50) (40, 70) 
MR 7 (151, 55) (39, 65) 
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